

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



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**CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS
OF A NATO GROUND FORCES CAMPAIGN
IN KOSOVO**

by

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June 2000

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**CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS
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IN KOSOVO**

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ABSTRACT

On March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started an air campaign by attacking targets in Serbia, including Kosovo. This thesis analyzes the question: “What might have happened if Serbia had not retreated and NATO had had to conduct a ground forces campaign to achieve its objectives?”

The aggregated combat model uses the situational force scoring (SFS) methodology, introduced by RAND, to compute force ratio, attrition, and movement as the result of combat. For a portion of the campaign analysis, the General Campaign Analysis Model (GCAMTM), developed by *Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc.*, is used.

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